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Hellerstein: Criminal Law Rulings

"SHAKIN' AND BAKIN':" THE SUPREME COURT'S
REMARKABLE CRIMINAL LAW RULINGS

OF THE 1999 TERM
PROFESSOR WILLIAM E. HELLERSTEIN'
INTRODUCTION
The 1999 Term of the Supreme Court was fascinating in
numerous subject matter areas, none more so than in the field of
criminal law and procedure. Although the Court decided fewer
cases, seventy-three, than it has since the 1950's, twenty-seven
were criminal cases. Moreover, of the Court's twenty five-to-four
decisions, nine were criminal cases. It was also a Term in which,
generally speaking, the Court did not continue its erosion of the
rights of criminal defendants. Whether this signifies a change in
the Court's overall direction or whether it was a momentary blip
remains to be seen.
I. MIRANDA LIVES
The "drawing card" for the 1999 Term, of course, was
Dickerson v. United States,2 in which the Court had granted
certiorari to examine the continued viability of Miranda v.
Arizona.3 Although many of us held our breath, the Court's
decision reaffirming the constitutional foundation of Miranda had
the feel of anticlimax. Much of that feeling was attributable to the
one-sidedness of the seven-to-two vote and to the mundane texture
of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
But there's the rub. For it was Rehnquist himself who, as
Associate Justice in 1974, began the assault on Miranda. In

Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Brooklyn College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School; Professor Hellerstein teaches Constitutional Law, Civil
Rights Law, and Crirrinal Procedure. He is an expert in criminal law and
constitutional litigation, and has argued numerous appeals before the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the New York Court of Appeals.
2 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). (Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and,
Breyer joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Thomas
joined).
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Michigan v. Tucker,4 Rehnquist argued for the first time that the
Miranda warnings themselves were not constitutionally required
but were merely prophylactic admonitions meant to protect the
privilege against self-incrimination. Yet, in Dickerson he writes
the Court's opinion that saves Miranda from the dustbin of history.
At issue in Dickerson was the relationship to Miranda of
§ 3501 of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, 5 enacted by
Congress in the midst of strong political reaction. 6 Essentially,
§ 3501 reinstated the "voluntariness" or "totality of the
circumstances" test for determining the admissibility of statements
obtained by custodial interrogation from a suspect, the standard
which the Miranda Court considered unsatisfactory for the
protection of the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.
Despite the presence since 1968 of § 3501, the Government
had persistently declined to rely on it to avoid suppression of a
defendant's confession obtained in the absence of Miranda
warnings, even though the Court continued to reiterate that the7
warnings were not themselves mandated by the Constitution.
And, in Davis v. United States,8 Justice Scalia at oral argument 9
and in a concurring opinion, 10 expressed both anger and dismay
about the Government's refusal to rely on § 3501.

4 417

U.S. 433 (1974).

' 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).
6See S. REP. No. 1097 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 21112, 2112432 (stating purpose of section 3501 was to prevent the "rigid, mechanical"
exclusion from evidence of voluntary confessions based solely on police failure
to comply with the "inflexible requirements of the majority opinion in the

Miranda case").

See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (overriding
considerations of public safety justified arresting officer's failure to provide
Miranda warning to accused prior to inquiring as to whereabouts of abandoned
weapon where accused was apprehended after a chase wearing an empty
shoulder holster); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (failure to advise
burglary suspect of Miranda rights initially did not preclude subsequent waiver
of rights when suspect made second incriminating statement after being properly
warned).
8 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
9 Transcript of oral argument in Davis v. United States, 1994 U.S. Trans. LEXIS
116, at *40-45.
10 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,462-65 (Scalia, J. concurring).
7
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Justice Scalia's Davis viewpoint received a friendly
reception in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, a court fairly well populated by Federalist Society types
and viewed by many as the most conservative federal appellate
court in the nation. When the Government appealed the trial
court's suppression of Dickerson's confession but again did not
rely on § 3501, the court of appeals felt obliged to raise the issue
sua sponte. It co:ncluded that all of the "prophylaxis" talk in
Tucker and the cases which repeated it, meant a great deal and it
held that since Tucker and its progeny said that the Miranda
warnings were not constitutionally required, Congress could
supersede Miranda and that § 3501 was constitutional. 1
So what happened in the Supreme Court? And to the Chief
Justice in particular? As Justice Scalia points out in his Dickerson
dissent, 12 Rehnquist's opinion cannot be squared with Rehnquist's
own writings in Michigan v. Tucker 3 and with what was said
15
14
subsequently in New York v. Quarles and Oregon v. Elstad.
And Justice Scalia is right. It can't. In fact, the Tucker-QuarlesElstad view of Miranda provided opponents of Miranda their best
argument for upholding § 3501.
On the other hand, supporters of Miranda, of which I am
one, argued that Tucker and its progeny were themselves
intellectually dishonest in concluding that the Miranda warnings
were not constitutionally required.' 6 We argued that the Miranda
warnings were constitutional mandates for several reasons. First,
i United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that § 3501
legislatively overruled Miranda and restored the voluntariness test for
admissibility of criminal confessions in federal court), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2326

(2000).
12Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2337-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13 417 U.S. 433 (1974).

14467 U.S. 649 (1984) (overriding considerations of public safety justified
arresting officer's failure to provide Miranda warning to accused prior to

inquiring as to whereabouts of abandoned weapon where accused was
apprehended after a chase wearing an empty shoulder holster).
"470 U.S. 298 (1985) (failure to advise burglary suspect of Miranda rights did

not preclude subsequent waiver of rights when suspect responded to unwarned
uncoercive questioning by police).
yet
16 William E. Hellerstein, The Miranda Wars Reopen: Border Skirmish or Major
Conflagration? 4 BLS LAW NOTES 7 (1999); Charles S. Weisselberg, Saving
Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 109 (1998).
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17
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Miranda said as much.
Second, if the warnings were not constitutionally grounded, the
States could not be required to comply with Miranda. Not only
had no state court ever taken that position, the Rehnquist Court, in
Withrow v. Williams,18 had sustained a state defendant's federal
habeas corpus petition because his conviction had been based on a
confession obtained without Miranda warnings, a remedy that is
only available when the federal constitution has been violated
and
9
Clause.'
Supremacy
the
of
because
recede
must
state law
Justice Douglas' dissent in Michigan v. Tucker2" made
many of these arguments. And, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
Dickerson opinion reads much like that dissent. So how explain
the Chief Justice's turn of mind? Here's where the fun begins.
Several views have been offered:
Professor Stephen Saltzburg of George Washington
University Law School has opined that Associate Justice Rehnquist
would have voted to uphold § 3501 but Chief Justice Rehnquist
has increasingly assumed a leadership role and that he did not want
to see three decades of Mirandajurisprudence going up in smoke.
Also, the Chief Justice is comfortable with Miranda and believes
that the police can live with it. Linda Greenhouse, the New York
Times Supreme Court Reporter, focused on Rehnquist's reliance in
part on City of Boerne v. Flores,2 1 the 1997 decision that

17 In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.433 (1974), Justice Rehnquist had focused on

Chief Justice Warren's statement in Miranda that the Constitution did not
mandate "adherence to any particular solution." Id. at 444 (quoting Miranda,
384 U.S. at 467). However, Justice Rehnquist omitted the remainder of the
quoted passage from Miranda which authorized a departure from the required
warnings only if they were replaced by alternatives that were equally effective.
As Justice Brennan urged in a memorandum to Chief Justice Warren, the Court
should allow the states a degree of flexibility so as to cushion the impact of the
decision. That memorandum, whose message Warren embraced, made it clear
that the warnings specified in Miranda were minimum constitutional
requirements. See Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. at 12325.
18 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
19U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, provides in pertinent part that, "[t]his Constitution
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof...
shall be the supreme law of the land.... ." Id.

20 417 U.S. at 461-66.

21 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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overturned the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 22 which, to her,
meant that Rehnquist was solidifying the Court's institutional
position by letting Congress know who's in charge when it 23comes
to having the final say as to the meaning of the Constitution.
There is much to be said for both of these speculations. I
offer a third which, meaning no disrespect, is a tad more cynical.
And that is, even as Chief Justice, had Rehnquist had the votes, he
would have dumped Miranda and followed his Tucker theme,
which was no fly-by-night affair. But having only two votes to
dump Miranda, Scalia and Thomas, he chose the high road and
wrote the truth about Miranda that most of us who were around
when it was decided understood it to hold. Thus, he turned the
defeat of his own crabbed view of Miranda into a carpe diemstatesmanlike reaffirmance of a constitutional landmark while, at
the same time, adding, as frosting on the cake, the institutional
strengthening of the Supreme Court's role in our constitutional
framework, in the tradition of the great Chief Justice, John
Marshall. The only one who need not speculate on the Chief
Justice's turnabout is the Chief Justice himself. But, I do not think
we'll be hearing from him on this subject in the near future.

II. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
From the defense side of the aisle, this was a remarkably
pleasant Fourth Amendment year.
Of the four decisions
rendered,24 law enforcement won only one.
In Bond v. United States,25 the Court held that a border
patrol agent's manipulation of the defendant's luggage in an
overhead rack on the26bus in which he was a passenger violated the
Fourth Amendment.
22

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).

23

Linda Greenhouse, A Turf Battle's Unlikely Victim, N.Y.

TIMES,

June 28,

2000 at Al.
24

Bond v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 1462 (2000); Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375

(2000); Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000); Flippo v. West Virginia, 528
U.S. 11, 120 S. Ct. 7 (1999).
25 120 S. Ct. 1462 (2000).
16Id. at 1463.
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Bond was a passenger on a Greyhound bus, traveling from
California to Little Rock, Arkansas. At a permanent checkpoint in
Texas, a border patrol agent checked the immigration status of the
passengers. As the agent walked down the aisle towards the exit
door, he "squeezed" Bond's luggage. He felt a "brick-like" object,
and Bond later consented to the agent's opening the luggage. The
agent found a "brick" of methamphetamine wrapped in duct tape.
Bond was convicted of conspiracy to possess and possession with
intent to distribute. 27 The district court denied his motion to
suppress. The Fifth Circuit affirmed his conviction, finding that
the manipulation of the bag was not a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.28
The Supreme Court reversed, with only two dissenters,
Justices Breyer and Scalia. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, first stated that the luggage is an "effect" protected by the
Fourth Amendment. 29 He then turned to the question of whether
Bond's exposing his luggage to the public negated his claim that
the "squeezing" was a Fourth Amendment "search." He stated that
under the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, whether a
governmental official conducted a search depends on two issues:
(1) "'whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an
actual expectation of privacy" and (2) if so, "whether the
is 'one that society is prepared
individual's expectation of privacy
30
to recognize as reasonable.'
As to the first issue, Rehnquist noted that Bond had used an
opaque bag and that he had placed it just above his seat; thus Bond
had exhibited an actual expectation of privacy. 31 As to the second,
whether this expectation was reasonable, the Chief Justice
a
discussed the Court's "public exposure" decisions, and found 32
difference between "visual" observation and tactile manipulation.
He noted that in prior cases, when officials gathered information
by flying over a person's property, this type of public exposure
27 id.
28

United States v. Bond, 167 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 1462

(2000).
29
Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1464.
30

d. at 1465.

31id.

32

id.
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signified that a person did not have a "reasonable" expectation of
privacy.33 In California v. Ciraolo,34 the Court had held that an
airplane flying above property at 1,000 feet did not violate the
Fourth Amendment and in Florida v. Riley,35 the Court held that a
police helicopter flying above property at 400 feet did not violate
the Fourth Amendmkent.
Rehnquist pointed out, however, that the agent's tactile
manipulation of Bond's luggage differed from mere visual
observation; it was more intrusive than the touching a bus
passenger would expect from "other passengers or bus
employees." 36 Also, what distinguished the agent's touching from
the touching by others was its "exploratory" manner. This type of
touching was more intrusive than that expected from other
passengers.37
At a previous forum in this hall, I bemoaned the manner
and frequency with which the Court had used the "expectation of
privacy" doctrine, given to us in the landmark Fourth Amendment
friendly case of Katz v. United States,3 8 to shrink rather than
expand a person's privacy zone.39 It is refreshing that the Court
has foregone another opportunity to again shrink Fourth
Amendment protections.
In two cases, the Court focused on two frequent street
scenarios that raise "reasonable suspicion" conundra in the
application of the stop and frisk doctrine of Terry v. Ohio.40
Illinois v. Wardlow 41 required the Court to assess what weight a
person's mere flight at the sight of the police can be given, and
Florida v. J.L. 42 required the Court to assess what quantum of
suspicion an anonymous tip about an individual's possession of a
weapon should be given.

33 id.

34 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
35488
U.S. 445 (1989).
36
37

Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1464.

1Id. at 1465.

38

39
40

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
William E. Hellerstein, FourthAmendment, 6 TOURO L. REv. 31. 48 (1989).

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

41528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000).
42

529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (2000).
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In Wardlow, the defendant had been walking in a "high
crime" neighborhood in Chicago. The neighborhood was known
for drug trafficking and police officers expected to find drug
dealers, lookouts, and buyers. Police officers formed a caravan of
four cars, looking for drug trafficking in the area. The trial record
established that the officers in the fourth car were in uniform, but it
did not specify whether any of the officers drove marked cars.4 3
When the fourth car in the caravan passed the comer where
Wardlow stood holding an opaque bag, Wardlow looked in the
direction of the officers and fled. 4 The officers followed in their
car, as Wardlow ran through a gangway and alley. Cornered by
the police, Wardlow stopped. One of the officers immediately
frisked him for weapons. He squeezed the bag and felt a heavy,
hard object similar to the shape of a gun.a5 Opening the bag, he
46
Wardlow
found a gun and ammunition, and arrested Wardlow.
was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon after a bench
trial and received a two-year sentence. The Illinois appellate
courts reversed, holding that the officers lacked reasonable
suspicion for a Terry stop. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding
47
that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the stop.
In Florida v. J.L.,4 8 the Miami-Dade Police received an
anonymous call stating that a young black male, wearing a plaid
shirt, was standing at a bus stop and had a gun.49 The tip also
referred to the presence of "several young black males" at the
stop. 50 Two officers responded and went to the bus stop and saw
three black males, one of whom was wearing a plaid shirt.5 1 One
officer told J.L, who was wearing a plaid shirt, to put his hands on
the bus stop. He then frisked him and found a gun. The other
officer frisked the others and found nothing. 52 The state charged
J.L. with carrying a concealed weapon without a license and
Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 674-75.
44Id.
at 675.
45
41

Id.

46d.

47

41
49

Id. at 676.

529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375.
J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1377.

50 Id.
51 id.

521d.
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possessing a firearm without a license while under eighteen. The
trial court granted J.L.'s motion to suppress the gun, an
intermediate court reversed, and the Florida Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the stop was invalid under Terry because
there was no reasonable suspicion and that there was no "firearms
exception" to stop and frisk jurisprudence.53 The Supreme Court
affirmed on both grounds: no reasonable suspicion5 4 and no
"firearms exception to Terry.55
In Wardlow, the Court split along traditional conservative
and liberal lines in deciding the issue whether the police officers
had reasonable suspicion for the stop. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion was subsciribed to by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas; Justice Stevens' concurring and dissenting opinion
was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer. In Floridav.
J.L., the Court unanimously agreed that the officer lacked
reasonable suspicion; only Justice Kennedy joined by the Chief
Justice stated in a concurrence that the Court's holding was factspecific, and would have little effect on the ability of56the police to
use anonymous tips to establish reasonable suspicion.
When applying Terry's "reasonable suspicion" standard,
one should never fail to appreciate the extremely fact-driven nature
of stop and frisk cases. In Wardlow, the Court did not hold that
flight alone gives rise to reasonable suspicion for a stop. Nor did it
hold that presence by itself in a high crime area creates reasonable
suspicion. But, when you put two such factors together, things
may change, especially if a person exhibits "nervous, evasive
behavior" which the Court characterized as not "going about one's
business." 57 The Court distinguished between a person's ignoring
a police officer and walking away, and a person's running
"headlong" after spotting a police officer.58 Thus, presence in a
high crime area and running headlong can combine to satisfy the
reasonable suspicion required quantum - as was the case with
Wardlow himself.
3 Id. at

1377-78.
" Id. at 1378-79.
5'
Id. at 1379-80.
56 J.L.,
120 S. Ct. at 13,81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
" Wardlow, 1.20 S. Ct. at 676.
58 Id.
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Dissenting, Justice Stevens believed there were too many
questions left open: (1) whether the other police cars were marked
or unmarked; (2) whether the other officers were in uniform; (3)
whether Wardlow was near anyone when he ran; (4)whether the
address of the stop was the intended destination of the police
caravan; (5) whether the officers drove quickly; and (6) whether
Wardlow saw the other cars in the police caravan. 59 But the most
important point made by Justice Stevens, especially in this season
of racial profiling and very troubled minority community-police
relationships is his cogent reminder that:
[a]mong some citizens, particularly minorities and
those residing in high crime areas, there is the
possibility that the fleeing person is entirely
innocent, but, with or without justification, believes
that contact with the police can itself be dangerous,
apart from any criminal activity associated with the
officer's sudden presence. For such a person,
unprovoked flight is neither "aberrant" or
"abnormal." Moreover, these concerns and fears
are known to the police officers themselves and are
validated by law enforcement investigations into
their own practices. Accordingly, the evidence
supporting the reasonableness of these beliefs is too
pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and too
persuasive to
be disparaged as inconclusive or
60
insufficient.
In Floridav. J.L, 61 the Court was surprisingly of one voice
in concluding that reasonable suspicion was lacking. In Alabama
v. White, 62 the Court had found an anonymous tip sufficient to
meet the reasonable suspicion standard. Characterizing White as a
"close case," the Court stated that unlike in White, the tipster in
J.L. did not provide any predictive information that the officers
could corroborate.63 All that the tipster had was information about

59 Id.
at 678-79

(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

60
61 Id. at 680-81.

J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375.
62496 U.S. 325 (1990).
63

J.L., 120 S.Ct. at 1378-79.
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what was currently happening. 64 The Court also rejected the
prosecution's request for a "firearm exception" to Terry, which
would have allowed officers to stop and frisk citizens based on an
anonymous tip that the person had an illegal gun. It stated that
such an exception would allow citizens to easily harass each other.
It also added that it could not narrowly define such an exception,
pointing out that several courts have assumed that if a person has
drugs, then the person also has guns. 65 Thus, bare-boned
anonymous tips about guns or drugs and guns as a predicate for a
forcible stop are constitutionally unacceptable. However, the
Court hinted that it might not be as demanding with respect to tips
relating to a bomb and searches where individuals have a
diminished expectation of privacy, such as at airports and
schools.66 Although dicta, I would take this statement seriously.
Somewhat concerned about the impact of the Court's
decision on police practices in regard to anonymous tips Justice
Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, provided some helpful hints as
to how to handle: anonymous callers such as (1) using caller
identification; (2) recording the calls and comparing the voice to
the voice of reliable tipsters; and (3) tracing the call and sending
squad cars immediately to the location of the call.67
The last of the Fourth Amendment decisions, Flippo v.
West Virginia,68 was decided per curiam, and was a reaffirmation
of the holding of Mincey v. Arizona,69 which rejected the creation
of a "crime scene exception" to the warrant requirement.
In Flippo, the police responded to a 911 call that had
reported an attack at a cabin. When police officers arrived, they
found the defendant outside the cabin. His head and legs were
injured. The officers questioned him, and one went inside the
cabin, finding the defendant's wife dead. The officers then closed
off the scene, examined the surrounding area for footprints, and
took the defendant to the hospital.7 ° Police officers reentered the
64Id. at 1379.
65 Id. at 1379-80.

at 1380.
Id. at 1381 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6' 528 U.S. 11, 120 S. Ct. 7 (1999).
6Id.
67

69

70

437 U.S. 385 (1978).
Flippo, 120 S. Ct. at 7.
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cabin at 5:30 a.m. to "process the crime scene" by taking pictures
and searching the cabin. The trial court denied the motion to
suppress on the ground that the Fourth Amendment authorized a
"homicide crime scene" search. The appellate court denied
review.7 ' Obviously both courts had either not heard or cared
about Mincey.
Flippo and Mincey permit the police to make warrantless
entries into homes when they reasonably believe that a person
within is in need of immediate aid. They also allow officers to
search the area to find other victims or to find a killer on the
premises. But contrary to common understanding, perhaps derived
from watching too many episodes of Law and Order 72 or NYPD
Blue, 3 police still need a warrant to reenter a crime scene to
conduct a subsequent investigation. However, in Flippo, the Court
left open whether 74the defendant's call for help gave "implied
consent to search.,
III. SENTENCING AND DUE PROCESS
Compared to Dickerson and three of the four search and
seizure decisions just discussed, Apprendi v. New Jersey75 was
little noticed as it lay on the Court's docket. And even after the
decision was handed down, it took a while for it to be appreciated
for the bombshell that it is.
In Apprendi, a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the
constitutional guarantees of trial by jury and due process requires
that except for prior convictions, any fact that increases a
defendant's sentence beyond that provided by statute as the
maximum for the crime of conviction must be proved to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Apprendi was convicted for possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose, classified under New Jersey law as a "second
degree offense., 76 New Jersey's "hate crime" law authorized the
7' Id. at 7-8.

Law & Order(NBC television broadcast).
NYPD Blue (ABC television broadcast).
74
Flippo, 120 S. Ct. at 8-9.
71 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
76
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995).
72

73

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss1/23

12

Hellerstein: Criminal Law Rulings

2000

CRIMINAL LAW RULINGS

trial court to determine by a preponderance of evidence that the
crime was a "hate crime" and to impose a greater sentence than
would have been allowable for the firearms charge alone. 77 The
ordinary firearm offense carried a sentence range of five-to-ten
years.
Under the hate crime statute, a judge finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that a crime was committed "with a
purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because
of race" could impose a sentence between ten-to-twenty years.7 9
After a hearing, the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of
the evidence that Apprendi had fired his weapon with a motivation
80
of racial bias and sentenced Apprendi to twelve years in prison.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens and joined
by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, immediately had
to deal with the fact that two relatively recent decisions had upheld
statutes involving enhanced sentences based upon judicial findings
of fact under a preponderance standard.
In McMillan v.
8
Pennsylvania, 1 the Court had sustained a statute that specified that
a person convicted of certain felonies receive a mandatory
minimum five-year sentence if the trial judge concluded by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly possessed
a firearm in the course of committing the crime. And, in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the Court had upheld a
sentence that had been enhanced beyond the term provided for by
the statute of conviction upon the trial judge's finding that the
defendant, who was charged with being in the United States after
being deported, "had previously been convicted of a felony.
However, in a more recent case, Jones v. United States, 3 the Court
said in a footnote that its prior cases suggested that "under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury
trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must

"N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000).
78 N.J.

STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995).
§ 2C:43-7(a)(3) (West Supp. 2000).

79

N.J. STAT. ANN.

80

Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2351.

" 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
82 523 U.S. 224 (1998).

" 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
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be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proven
84
doubt."
reasonable
a
beyond
The significance of Apprendi, is appreciable in a number of
ways. First, Justice Stevens suggested in a footnote that McMillan
may be due for reconsideration, and limited it to "cases that do not
involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory
maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict."85
Second, Stevens questioned seriously the correctness of the
Court's decision in Almendarez-Torres, stating that at best, it
represents an exceptional departure from historic practice and is a
"narrow" recidivism exception to the general rule. There was no
need to reconsider Almendarez-Torres because the defendant had
admitted his prior convictions and no additional fact had to be
87
proven.
Apprendi's significance grows even more when the views
expressed by other Justices are examined. Justice Thomas would
have gone much further than the majority. He would have
overruled both McMillan and Almendarez-Torres.88 He proposed a
rule that any fact that "is by law the basis for imposing or
increasing punishment - for establishing or increasing the
prosecutor's entitlement" to a particular kind, degree, or range of
punishment "is an element" This would cover both recidivism and
situations in which 89a fact triggers the application of a mandatory
minimum sentence.
Justice O'Connor, joined in dissent by the Chief Justice and
Justices Kennedy and Breyer, called the decision a "watershed
change in constitutional law"90 and warned that it would undo
"significant sentencing reform accomplished at the federal and
state levels over the past three decades." 91 Justice O'Connor also
made several suggestions as to how to avoid the Court's decision.
She stated that a state could widen the sentencing range for crimes
and make the upper end of the range available only upon the trial
84

Jonev, 526 U.S. at 243, n.6.

85 Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2361, n.13.
86 Id. at 2361-62.

Id.
Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2378-79 (Thomas, J., concurring).
89 Id.at 2368-69 (Thomas, J., concurring).
90 Id. at 2380 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87
88

91Id. at 2394 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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court's finding, under the preponderance standard, of a purpose to
intimidate. If that did not work, then the Court's decision would
have "severe" consequences for sentencing in many jurisdictions.
If it did work, then the Court's decision
would do no more than
92
require "meaningless formalism."
Clearly something very important has happened here. But
what that is remains to be seen. Are the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, and similar sentencing schemes, imperiled, as
suggested by the dissenters? There is certainly a possibility that
Apprendi could be extended and that Almendarez-Torres and even
McMillan could be overturned. Not only would such a turn have a
dramatic impact prospectively, it would raise very serious
questions under retroactivity principles. Enhanced sentences that
are predicated on constitutionally inadequate fact-findings would
seem entitled to correction retroactively just as is a conviction
violative of the reasonable doubt standard of In Re Winship,93 as
the Court held in Ivan V v. The City of New York. 94
On the other hand, it is important to appreciate the limits of
Apprendi, as to what the decision by its own terms does not do.
First, it does not address the ability of judges to exercise discretion
in choosing a sentence within statutorily defined limits. Nor does
it address a state', ability to define crimes, to set punishments, or
to allow for significant ranges of permissible sentences for a given
crime. For example, at least for now, New Jersey could redraft its
hate crime statute and make the range of a second-degree felony
whose purpose was to intimidate on account of race zero-to-twenty
years or ten-to-twenty years, thus allowing the trial judge to
impose a sentence of twelve years, as he did in Apprendi. New
Jersey could also create separate crimes for those involving proof
of acting with a purpose to discriminate and set a higher range than
for those not requiring such proof. Only as to the former would a
jury have to decide the additional "hate" element.
In Castillo v. United States,95 the Court also had to confront
the "elements" or "sentencing factor" conundrum and to again
92 Id. at 2390-92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9'397 U.S. 358 (1970).
94 407 U.S. 203 (1972)

9'120 S. Ct. 2090 (2000).
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97
96
"feel the breath" upon its Jones and Almendarez-Torres
decisions, which, I believe, pushed it to place the statute in
question in the "elements of crime," column, rather than treat the
statute as a sentencing statute. At issue was whether the specified
types of firearms listed in the statute are elements of an offense
that must be determined by a jury. The statute read that "Whoever,
during and in relation to any crime of violence.. ., uses or carries a
firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime... , be sentenced to imprisonment for five years..., and if
to imprisonment for thirty
the firearm is [ e.g.,] a machinegun, ....
98
years.
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer held that the statute
uses the word "machinegun" (and similar words) to state an
element of a separate, aggravated crime. 99 He reasoned that (1) the
statute's overall structure strongly favors the "new crime"
interpretation; 100 (2) courts have not traditionally used firearm
types (such as "machinegun)" as sentencing factors where the use
or carrying of the firearm is itself the substantive crime; 1 1 (3) to
ask a jury, rather than a judge, to decide whether a defendant used
a machinegun would not complicate a trial or risk unfairness; 10 2 (4)
the legislative history of the statute favors interpreting the statute
as setting forth elements, 10 3 and (5) the length and severity of an
added mandatory sentence that turns on the presence or absence of
a machine gun weighs in favor1 4of treating such offense-related
words as referring to an element.
Although Justice Breyer stated that the "elements" issue
was easier to resolve than in Almendarez-Torres,'°5 in which the
Court was split 5-4,106 1 believe the Court was happy to avoid the
constitutional issue that it had to face squarely in Apprendi and

96 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227.
97 Almendarez-Torrez v. United States, 523 U.S. 224.
9' 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
99 Castillo, 120 S.Ct. at 2091.

'0o
Id. at 2093.
" Id. at 2093-94.
102Id.at 2094-95.
103 Id. at 2095-96.
'04 Id. at 2096.

'o5 523 U.S. 224.
'06 Castillo, 120 S.Ct. at 2096.
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which it had not yet decided. And by applying the traditional rule
that an ambiguous penal statute 0 7 would be0 8construed in favor of
the defendant, the Court was able to do that.1
IV. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
AND'THE ACT OF PRODUCTION DOCTRINE
The "act of production" doctrine, first announced by the
Supreme Court in Fisher v United States,10 9 has been viewed by
some as inadequate to protect the true purposes of the privilege
against self-incrimination. 1 10 The essence of the doctrine is that if
the custodian of documents subpoenaed by the Government was
not compelled to create them, the documents themselves fall
outside the privilege; the act of production, assuming its relevance
to a particular criminal charge, is all that is barred.
In United States v. Hubbell,"' even though the prosecution
disclaimed reliance on the act of production, the Court stated that
there still remained the question of whether the government had
already made use derivatively of the testimonial aspect of that act
in obtaining the indictment against Hubbell." 2 In an eight-to-one
decision with Chief Justice Rehnquist the sole dissenter, the Court
held that a grand jury witness who, having been served with a
107

See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, n.17 (1994) (rule of

lenity requires that "ambiguous criminal statute[s] ... be construed in favor of
the accused"); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971).
108Castillo, 120

S. Ct. at 2096.

U.S. 391, 400-02 (1975).
"o See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (1975) (Brennan J.
concurring) ("An individual's books and papers are generally little more than an
'09 425

extension of his person. They reveal no less than he could reveal upon being
questioned directly. Many of the matters within an individual's knowledge may
as easily be retained within his head as set down on a scrap of paper. I perceive
no principle which does not permit compelling one to disclose the contents of
one's mind but does permit compelling the disclosure of the contents of that

scrap of paper by compelling its production." * * * "For it is not enough that the
production of a writing, or books and papers, is compelled. Unless those
materials are such as to come within the zone of privacy recognized by the
[Fifth] Amendment, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination does
not protect against their production"). Id. at 423.
. 120 S. Ct. 2037 (200).
112 Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. at 2046.
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subpoena duces tecum and granted immunity, produces documents
that the government is unable to identify with precision in the
subpoena is protected by the immunity grant from being
prosecuted on criminal
charges that were prepared with the help of
13
the documents)
The Hubbell of the case, of course, was Webster Hubbell,
former Associate Attorney General of the United States and close
friend of President Clinton and Mrs. Clinton. As you may recall,
the Independent Counsel, Kenneth Starr, investigating the
Whitewater scandal,' 14 obtained an indictment against Hubbell for
mail fraud and tax evasion arising out of his billing practices at the
Rose Law Firm in Little Rock, Arkansas. Hubbell pled guilty and
agreed to cooperate
fully with the Independent Counsel in regard
5
11
to Whitewater.
Starr's second prosecution of Hubbell, for additional tax
evasion, resulted from Starr's attempt to determine whether
Hubbell had fulfilled his agreement to cooperate. Accordingly, he
subpoenaed from Hubbell, eleven categories of documents,
totaling more than 13,000 pages, for production before a Little
Rock Grand Jury. 16 Hubbell refused to state whether he had those
documents and Starr obtained a court order directing him to
respond and granting him immunity "to the extent allowed by
law."' 17 Hubbell then produced the documents, which provided the
basis for a second indictment, in the District of Columbia. Of 10
counts of tax related crimes, and mail and wire fraud.'18
The district court dismissed the indictment as violative of
the immunity grant. 19 The court of appeals vacated that decision
3Id.at 2046-47.
114

Whitewater refers to the investigation in which Independent Counsel

Kenneth Starr sought to determine "whether any individuals or entities ha[d]
committed a violation of any federal criminal law, other than a Class B or C
misdemeanor or infraction, relating in any way to James B. McDougal's,
President William Jefferson Clinton's, or Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton's
relationships with Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association, Whitewater
Development Corporation, or Capital Management Services, Inc." United States
v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 554-55 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
n5 Hubbell, 120 S.Ct. at 2040.
116id.
117
Id.

' Id.
at 2041.

"9United States v. Hubbell,

11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 33-37 (D.D.C. 1998).
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and remanded the case so that the Mr. Starr could prove at a
hearing that his office came upon the evidence leading to the
indictment from a source independent of the testimonial value of
Hubbell's compelled act of production in response to the
subpoena. 120 Star acknowledged that he could not make such a
showing but argued that he was not required to do so.
In the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, held that Starr's concession that he could not prove
independent source: required dismissal of the indictment.12'
Because I have found that the "act of production" doctrine
confounds not only law students, but active practitioners, it is
worth a moment's time to relate Justice Stevens' review of its
governing principles: First, Fisher established that a person may
be required to produce specific documents even though they
contain incriminating evidence because the creation of those
documents was not "compelled" within the meaning of the
privilege. 122 But thle act of producing documents in response to a
subpoena may have a compelled testimonial aspect in that the
witness could be admitting that the papers existed, were in his
possession or control, and were authentic. 123 Second, compelled
testimony that communicates information that may lead to
incriminating evidence is privileged even if the information itself
is not inculpatory. 124 Applying these principles to the subpoenaed
documents, Stevens concluded that the compelled testimony was
not in the contents of the records but
in the testimony inherent in
25
documents.
the
producing
of
the act
Starr argued that he did not need to introduce the
documents into evidence in order to prove the charges against
Hubbell and thus he was not making improper use of Hubbell's
compelled testimony. Stevens responded that this is a separate
question from whether Start had already made derivative use of the
testimonial aspect of the act of production in obtaining the

120 Hubbell,
121Hubbell,

122

167 F.3d at 581.
120 S. Ct. at 2048.

Id. at 2043.

123 id.

124

Id.

125

Id.at 2043-44.
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126
indictment and preparing for trial-which Starr clearly had.
Stevens pointed out that the text of the subpoena itself showed that
Starr needed Hubbell's assistance both (a) to identify potential
sources of information and (b) produce those sources. Stevens
likened it to requiring Hubbell to answer a set of interrogatories or
give oral testimony as to the location of particular documents
fitting a broad description- in contrast to asking for a specific
document: "[t]he assembly of those documents was like telling an
inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to
surrender the key to a strong box."' 127 Stevens also noted that
Hubbell's act of producing the documents was the first step in a
chain that led to the prosecution: the documents arrived not as
"'manna from heaven,"' but only after Hubbell "took the mental
and physical steps necessary to provide the prosecutor with an
accurate inventory of the many sources
of potentially incriminating
128
evidence sought by the subpoena."
The importance of the Hubbell decision lies in the fact that
it counterbalances or offsets the Court's "act of production"
doctrine, which defines very narrowly the meaning of
"compelled," by increasing the scope of derivative use immunity
and thereby making it more difficult for the government to meet
the independent source standard.
Justice Thomas' concurring opinion which Justice Scalia
joined, is especially interesting. Justice Thomas believes the Court
should reconsider entirely the "act of production" doctrine which
the Court created in Fisher.129 In his view, the doctrine is based on
a misreading of the text of the Fifth Amendment itself. Although
the amendment states that a person shall not be compelled to be a
witness against himself, the history leading up to James Madison's
writing of the amendment meant that a person could not be
compelled to give evidence against himself because that's what
witnesses do. Madison's phrasing, Thomas argues, was not meant
to change this usage and there was no indication in the debates that
it was so intended. 30 Put another way, there was no difference to

116 Id. at 2044.
127

Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. at 2047.

128 Id. at 2046-47.
129 Id. at 2050 (Thomas,
130

J., concurring).

Id. at 2051-53 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Madison between a subpoena ad testificandum (which the Fifth
Amendment clearly prohibits) and a subpoena duces tecum (which
calls for previously created documents) and is allowed under
Fisher.
Thomas acknowledged (and advocated) that his analysis
could lead the Court to reexamine its departure from the doctrine
of Boyd v. United States, 3 ' which had rested to a substantial
degree on the idea that a subpoena of a person's personal papers
violated the privilege. 132 Whether a majority of the Court would
ever agree to return to Boyd and abandon the "act of production"
doctrine is highly questionable-especially since the impact on law
enforcement would be enormous.
V. AFFECTING LITIGATION STRATEGIES
The Supreme Court decided two cases that will have a
direct impact on defense strategies. I believe both decisions are
misguided and unfortunate. In Portuondo v. Agard,133 the Court
held that a prosecutor's comment during summation that the
defendant, who testified, had an opportunity to tailor his testimony
to that of other witnesses, did not violate either the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to testify on his own behalf, and be present
34
at his trial, or his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. 1
In a surprisingly one-sided, seven-to-two decision the
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, reversed the Second
Circuit's decision, written by Chief Judge Ralph Winter. Justice
Scalia framed the issue as one requiring an "extension" of Griffin
v. California,135 which, in 1965, held that a prosecutor could not
comment on a defendant's refusal to testify and that to allow such
comment unconstitutionally cuts down on the privilege against
self-incrimination by making its assertion costly.
Scalia observed first that no evidence historically supported
the defendant's argument and that the defendant had not cited one
3'116 U.S. 616 (1886).
3 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35.
529 U.S. 61, 120 S. Ct. 1119 (2000).
120 S. Cit. at 1122-28.
' 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
36

"

t14Portuondo,

Portuondo, 120 S.Ct. at 1123.
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37
case in which the practice was even challenged before Griffin.
Griffin, he said, prohibited the prosecution from urging the jury to
do what it was not permitted to do, something that was not natural.
By contrast, it is natural and irresistible for a jury, in evaluating a
defendant's credibility, to weigh in the balance that he heard the
testimony of all those who preceded him.13 8 Scalia further
distinguished Griffin as prohibiting comments that suggest a
defendant's silence is evidence of guilt; here, he argued, it is
merely a comment on the defendant's credibility
as a witness 139
which is always in issue when he testifies.
Scalia relied on Brooks v. Tennessee, 140 which struck down
Tennessee's requirement that the defendant testify first or not at
all. In that case, the Court adverted to the danger of "tailoring"
and said that there was a less heavy-handed way to deal with that the adversary system which reposes judgments of the credibility of
all witnesses in the jury.141 That New York law requires a
defendant to be present at his trial, 142 Scalia concluded, did not
lend support to the argument that there is a due process violation.
What apparently escaped Scalia's notice or concern is that,
ironically, the consequence of the Court's decision can be to force
a defendant to do what the unconstitutional Tennessee statute
required him to do - testify first.
Agard's counsel relied heavily on Doyle v. Ohio, 43 which
held that a defendant cannot be cross-examined as to why he
remained silent after receiving Miranda warnings. Scalia said there
might be reason to reconsider Doyle but that it was not necessary
to do so in this case: a statute requiring a defendant to be present at
trial does not contain a promise of no penalty similar to the one the
Court found in Doyle. '
Justice Stevens' concurrence, joined by Justice Breyer, is
more than a little puzzling. He didn't like the prosecutor's

37
'
38

Id. at 1124.

1

id.

139

Id. at 1125.

406 U.S. 605 (1972)
Brooks, 406 U.S. at 610.
142 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.45 (McKinney 2000).
143 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
144
Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1128.
140
141
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145
summation but didn't think it rose to a constitutional violation.
Nonetheless, he denounced it by stating that "it demeaned due
process," "violated respect for the petitioner's dignity," and
"ignored" the presumption of innocence. Stevens also said that he
agreed with much of the dissent, but he thought that trial judges
146
can protect a defendant with adequate instructions to the jury.
One might ask Justice Stevens how much more he needs to take it
to the level of a constitutional violation.
In dissent Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, stated
that the decision does not advance the truth because every
defendant who testifies is now subject to a generic accusation
about his opportunity for tailoring.1 47 She pointed out that the
prosecution is always free, on cross-examination, to raise the
tailoring issue, that all the Second Circuit had prohibited is the
prosecution from doing it when there is no particular reason to
believe tailoring has occurred, and that a generic accusation on
summation removes the benefit of doubt given in ambiguousa
situations by Griffin and Doyle, to the inference of innocence. 4
The consequence of the majority's position, she emphasized, 1is
49
that it can prevent a defendant from answering the charge.
Justice Ginsburg responded to Justice Scalia's historical argument
by pointing out that the common law customary practice of taking
pretrial statements, upon which Scalia relied, actually explained
why prosecutors at trial had no need to make generic tailoring
arguments
- and that is why defense counsel couldn't cite any
0

cases.

15

Now that prosecutors have been given constitutional
license to make generic tailoring arguments, what will happen in
New York? Agard's petition for leave to appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals was denied and, for a while, he was the rare
recipient of a favorable federal habeas corpus ruling by the Second
Circuit. Therefore, it is unlikely that the New York Court of
Appeals will find that the practice violates the New York
141 h/. at 1128-29 (Stevens, J., concurring).
'46

Id. at 1129 (Stevens, J., concurring).

Id. at 1129 (Ginsbw'g, J., dissenting).
i. at 1130-32 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
149 !d. at 1133 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting),
"0 Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1132-33 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
'41

148
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Constitution. I say unlikely only because individual judges of the
Court of Appeals, who must each rule on hundreds of leave
applications each year, occasionally overlook the significance of a
particular issue when considering a leave application. That had to
be the case in Portuondo v. Agard. In my view, any case that is
decided by the Supreme Court perforce must contain an issue
worthy of review by the New York Court of Appeals.
Nonetheless, I don't think this should be the end of the
discussion. There is nothing that compels a trial judge to allow a
"tailoring" accusation in a prosecutor's summation simply because
the Supreme Court has not condemned it as a constitutional matter.
As Justice Stevens maintained, the practice stinks for the reasons
he and Justice Ginsburg detailed. Moreover, we have never
51
subscribed exclusively to Holmes' "bad man" theory of the law.'
Quite the contrary, I believe many adhere to the principle that our
jurisprudential frame of reference imports norms that have far
greater moral gravitas. And, since we have always viewed our trial
judges as having broad discretion to insure the fairness of a trial,
there is nothing that requires a judge to mechanically approve a
prosecutor's attempt in summation to accuse a defendant of
tailoring when there is no basis for it other than the defendant's
presence at his own trial.
What then should defense counsel do given the possibility
that the prosecution may indulge itself with the fruits of Portuondo
v. Agard? First, counsel should ascertain from the judge if he or
she will allow it. If the answer is yes, then counsel must assess the
risks and advise the defendant accordingly on whether he or she
should testify. If the decision is that the defendant should testify,
then defense counsel should, during summation, attempt to
preempt the prosecutor by telling the jury that they may expect
such a statement from the prosecutor, and that the jury should
"1'

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. at 42-43,

reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC
WRITINGS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES at

393. (Sheldon M. Novick ed., Univ. of Chicago Press, 1995). "If we take the
view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws
for... axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what the
Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of this mind.
The prophecies of what courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law". Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss1/23

24

Hellerstein: Criminal Law Rulings

2000

CRIMINAL LAW RULINGS

appreciate that the prosecutor, when he or she had the chance do
so on cross-examination of the defendant, made no effort to attack
the defendant's testimony as tailored.
The second case that has a direct impact on trial strategy is
Ohler v. United States,' 52 in which the Court, in a five-to-four
decision held that in federal trials, a defendant who preemptively
introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct may not then
challenge on appeal, the trial judge's decision on a motion in
limine to allow the prosecution to use the prior conviction,
pursuant to Rule 609 (a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence1 53 to
impeach the defendant's credibility.
Ms. Ohler was charged with marijuana offenses. The trial
judge granted the Government's motion to admit her prior felony
conviction to impeach her credibility. In the face of that ruling,
defense counsel introduced it himself as part of the defedant's
direct case. The Ninth Circuit held that by introducing it, 54the
defendant had waived the right to contest the ruling on appeal. 1
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that
the case was governed by the "well-established common sense
principle" that "a party introducing evidence cannot complain on
appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted."' 55 Ohler
argued that a defendant who is forced to allow the prosecutor on
cross-examination to bring out prior convictions would appear to
be hiding the truth. The Government disputed that was the case.
Rehnquist made no attempt to resolve that issue; instead he pointed
out that both sides "must make choices as the trial progresses," and
acceptance of the defendant's position would deny the prosecution

152120

S. Ct. 1851 (2000).
R. EvID. 609(a)(1) states in pertinent part:
For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a
witness ... evidence that an accused has been convicted of
such a crime [punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year] shall be admitted if the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial affect to the accused.

153FED.

Id.

United States v. Olhler, 169 F.3d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1999), aff'd by Ohler,
120 S. Ct. 1851.
' Ohler, 120 S. Ct. at 1853.
154
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the right to make one of those choices. 156 Rehnquist explained that
even after prior convictions have been held admissible for
impeachment, the prosecution might decide not to risk using them
if the case appears to be going well. 157 He maintained that the
rule sought by the defendant would "short-circuit" the
prosecution's decisional process.' 58 Also, it would be inconsistent
with Luce v. United States, 159 which held that a defendant who
decides not to testify after an unfavorable ruling on the
admissibility of priors may not appeal the ruling after
conviction. 160
Justice Souter, joined in dissent by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that the majority's conclusion was
unprecedented and in disregard of the rules of evidence and the
reasonable objectives of a trial. 16 1 First, he pointed out that in
Luce, the defendant did not take the stand and therefore the Court's
decision turned on the practical realities of appellate review;
without the defendant's testimony, the Court would have had to
62
speculate on whether the trial judges ruling was harmless error. 1
Secondly, Luce was not a waiver case; it merely articulated the
incapacity of an appellate court to assess the significance of a
ruling to a defendant who did not testify. 63 Third, the Court's
reliance on the "common sense" rule that a party who introduces
evidence cannot complain on appeal is not based on common sense
when the party has opposed its admission and only seeks to
mitigate its effect; basic procedure assumes the right to mitigate in
the face of erroneous rulings.164
Finally, allowing the defendant to preemptively admit the
evidence promotes fairness without depriving the Government of
anything to which it is entitled; on the other hand, if the defendant
says nothing, the jury may infer that the defendant intended to
15 6

Id. at 1853-54.

57

Id. at 1854.
Id.

'

15 8

"9 469 U.S. 38 (1984).
"0 Ohler, 120 S. Ct at 1854.
161 1i.

at 1855 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1855 (Souter, J., dissenting).
163Id. at 1855-56 (Souter, J., dissenting).
162

'64

Id. at 1856 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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mislead. But if she does advert to the65 prior conviction, the
erroneous ruling is insulated from review.'
Defense attorneys in federal trials now face a very difficult
choice, perhaps even more difficult than that resulting from
Portuondov. Agard.166 Many factors will influence the decision as
to whether a defendant should take the stand. That the prosecutor
may avail herself of the generic tailoring argument in summation
may not, under a totality of circumstances, keep the defendant off
the stand. However, given the prevalence of motions in limine as
to the admissibility on cross examination of prior convictions,
defense counsel will have to face quite regularly the painfully
difficult choice of whether to take the sting out of the defendant's
prior convictions or waiving a viable attack on the court's decision
to allow them to be used in the first place.
Both cases clearly display the Supreme Court's willingness
to allow the prosecution to place extra fingers on the scale of
justice. A result in favor of the defendant in both Portuondo and
Ohler would cost the Government nothing.
In the Portuondo
context, the Government's "tailoring" concerns can be raised
easily on cross-examination. In the Ohler context, the government
always can place before the jury all of the defendant's prior
convictions which it is legitimately entitled to use. All that it
would have lost had the Court reversed Ohler's conviction would
have been the right to use the illicit windfall afforded it by a trial
judge's erroneous in limine ruling on the admissibility of some or
all of a defendant's prior convictions to impeach his or her
credibility.
VI. THE EXPOS"TFACTO CLAUSE

167

68
The Court decided three Ex Post Facto Clause cases.'
One, Carmell v. Texas, 169 is of particular significance in New York

Id. at 1857-58 (Souter, J., dissenting).
6 529 U.S. 61, 120 S. Ct. 1119 (2000).
167 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, states in pertinent part: "No state shall.., pass
any... ex post facto law... ." Id.
168 Johnson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1795 (2000); Carmell v. Texas, 120 S.
Ct. 1620 (2000); Garner v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 1362 (2000).
165

169

120 S. Ct. 1620.
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because it effectively overrules the New York Court of Appeals'
decision in People v. Hudy. 170 Both Hudy and Carmell involved
sex crimes against minors, and both involved a change in the rules
with respect to corroboration evidence necessary to convict.' 7 1 In
Carmell, the defendant was convicted of various offenses,
including sexually assaulting his stepdaughter when she was
between the ages of fourteen and eighteen.1 2 At the time of the
crimes, Texas law allowed a conviction that was based on the
uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual offense if the
victim made "fresh outcry," i.e. by informing any person, other
than the defendant, within six months of the date of the offense.
However, where the victim was under fourteen, the "fresh outcry"
was not required. 73 Subsequent to the dates of the defendant's
alleged offenses, the Texas statute was amended to eliminate the
"outcry" requirement for victims under the age of eighteen. 174 The
Supreme Court held that the State's reliance on the post-offense
amendment to obtain the defendant's conviction violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause.1 75 The Court split five-to-four, with Justice
Stevens writing for the majority; he was joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Souter, and Breyer. Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissentone of those rare events in which she was in the unusual company
of the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.
The majority held that the Texas statute, as amended,
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it altered the legal rules
of evidence and allowed the receipt of less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense

170

73 N.Y.2d 40, 535 N.E.2d 250, 538 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1988). The Court of

Appeals held that "The Ex Post Facto Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution does not require that a defendant be tried under the corroboration
rules that existed at the time his alleged crimes were committed. 73 N.Y.2d at
44-45.
171See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1624-26; Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d at 44-45.
172 Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1624.
173TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 38.07 (Vernon 1983).
174TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 38.07, as amended by Act of May 29,
1993, 73d LEG., REG. SESS., ch. 900 § 12.01, 1993 TEX. GEN. LAWS 3765, 3766,
and Act of May 10, 1993, 73d LEG., REG. SESS., ch. 200, § 1, 1993 TEX. GEN.
LAWS 387, 388.
175

Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1632-34.
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in order to convict the defendant.' 76 The issue before the Court
turned on whether the Texas statute as amended was a sufficiency
of evidence rule or a witness competency rule. The state courts
and Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, relied on Hopt v. Territory of
Utah,177 an 1884 decision which upheld the retrospective
application of a 'witness competency statute that allowed the
prosecution to present the testimony of witnesses who had been
convicted of felonies.
Justice Stevens stated that the Texas statute could not be
read as a witness competency statute. First, it began with the
words "a conviction.., is supportable," and a different Texas
statute dealt with the competency of witnesses. Secondly, rules
reducing the quantum of evidence "will always" run in the
prosecution's favor," and directly implicate "elements of
unfairness and injustice in subverting the presumption of
innocence." 178 On the other hand, rules relaxing prior restrictions
79
on witness competency do not always favor the prosecution.
Carmell is an important Ex Post Facto Clause decision. In
the seminal case of Calder v. Bull,' 80 Justice Chase stated that the
proscription againsit ex postfacto laws applied to four categories of
ex postfacto criminal laws: (1) a law that criminalizes conduct that
was legal before enactment of the law; (2) a law that aggravates a
crime, or makes it greater than when committed; (3) a law that
increases the punishment for a crime after the date of its
commission, and (4) a law that alters the legal rules of evidence,
and receives less or different testimony that facilitates conviction
of the offender. 181 The U.S. Government, appearing as amicus
curiae in Carmell, argued that the fourth category was not viable
and should be abandoned. It maintained that neither Blackstone
nor ex post facto clauses in Ratification-era state constitutions
mention the fourth category and thus Justice Chase got it wrong.
Id. at 1631. "The [Texas law] is unquestionably a law 'that alters the legal
rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the
offender."' Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
177 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
"' Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1640.
176

179

id.

IS0

3 U.S. 386 (1798).
U.S. at 391).

18.Calder,3
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Justice Stevens pointed out that to accept the Government's
argument would require the Court to also abandon the third
category because it too was not mentioned in those sources. 18'
In the second Ex Post Facto Clause case, Garner v.
Jones,183 the Court held that a Georgia law adopted in 1985
permitting an extension of the intervals between parole
considerations did not constitute an ex post facto law if applied
retrospectively. 184 By a six-to-three vote, in a majority opinion
written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justices O'Connor, Thomas, and Breyer, the Court based its ruling
on the fact that there was no record evidence that suggested that
there is a significant risk of prolonging the incarceration of
inmates."' 185 The Court felt secure in its conclusion because "the
statutory structure, its implementing regulations, and the Parole
Board's unrefuted representations regarding its operations do not
lead to the conclusion"
that there will be an increase in the length
86
of incarceration.'
Justice Souter dissented and was joined by Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg. He disagreed with the majority's assessment of the
risk to which inmates were exposed, arguing that Georgia officials
not only had given the courts insufficient information as to the
actual working of the new parole regime, they had affirmatively
resisted discovery.187 He also detailed88ways in which the system
could operate to prolong incarceration.1
The third Ex Post Facto Clause case, Johnson v. United
States,189 raised the question of whether a federal district court is
authorized to impose an additional term of supervised release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (h) after an individual was reimprisoned
for violating the terms of the initial supervised release.
The
Court, with Justice Souter writing for an eight member majority,
held that Congress so intended and that as thus construed there was
182 Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1634-36.
183120 S. Ct. 1362 (2000).
184 Garner, 120 S. Ct. at 1367-70.
85 Id. at 1369-71.

116Id. at 1369.
187 Id. at 1373-75 (Souter, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 1374, n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting).
189 120 S. Ct. 1795.

'90 Johnson, 120 S. Ct. at 1800-02.
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no Ex Post Facto Clause issue because the penalties imposed upon
revocation of supervised release qualify as punishment for the
original offense. 191
VII. HABEAS CORPUS
The Court decided several important habeas corpus cases
but time constraints limit my discussion considerably. Two cases
meriting discussion were each entitled Williams v. Taylor but
involved different petitioners. Both were capital cases and both
habeas petitioners prevailed - a remarkable event in its own right.
In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor 192 the Court, for the first
time, had to interpret Section 2254 (d)(1) of the 1994 Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).' 93 Under section 2254
(d)(1), a federal court may not grant habeas corpus relief on the
basis of a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the
state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
'1 94
States."
The alignment of the Justices requires a scorecard. The
segment of the decision that sets forth the critically important
statutory interpretation discussion was authored by Justice
O'Connor and joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas. The segment that describes the background of
the case and the application of the statute to the facts was written
by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
The O'Connor majority held that a state court decision that
applies a correctly identified federal constitutional standard in a
reasonable way must be upheld even if it conflicts with a federal
court's interpretation of the same standard. 195 This majority made
at 1802-07.

'Id.

192 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000).
193 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1994 ed., Supp.III), gives the court authority to grant

a habeas corpus petition if the prior state court decision was either "contrary to,
or . . .an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law." See
Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1503-04.
194

Id.

'9'
ld. at 1518-21.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000

31

Touro Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 [2000], Art. 23

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 17

it clear that Congress did more to limit the availability of federal
habeas review than merely codify the standards of Teague v.
Lane. 196 They concluded that the phrases "contrary to" and
"unreasonable application of' were intended by Congress to
establish two distinct exceptions to Section 2254 (d)'s general
prohibition on granting relief 197 Thus, a state court decision that is
"contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent is one
in which the state court either (1) arrives at a conclusion opposite
to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or (2)
"confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
relevant Supreme
Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite
'1 9 8
to ours."

Justice O'Connor noted that prior to AEDPA, federal
habeas courts reviewed constitutional claims under a "plenary" or
"de novo" standard of review. 199 But she took issue with Justice
Stevens' view that Congress' enactment of AEDPA did not effect
prior habeas corpus law in this regard.2 °° She argued that Stevens
had failed "to give independent meaning to both the 'contrary to'
and "unreasonable application" clauses of the statute." 20 ' In her
view, under § 2254(d)(1)'s 'unreasonable application' clause, a
federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that
court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously
or incorrectly.
Rather, that application must also be
unreasonable.
The complexity of this issue merits quoting
Justice O'Connor's summarization in full:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the
power of a federal habeas court to grant a state
prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus
with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in
state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue
only if one of the following two conditions is
196 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
197 Williams, 120 S. Ct. at
9I/d. at 1519.
19 9

2 Id. at
00Id. at
201 Id. at
20 2

1519-20.

1516-17.
1518.

1519.

Id. at 1520-21.
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satisfied-the state court adjudication resulted in a
decision that (1) "was contrary to... clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States," or (2)
"involved an unreasonable application of... clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States." Under the
"contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may
grant the writ if the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on
a question of law or if the state court decides a case
differently than this court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable
application" clause, a federal habeas court may
grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct
governing principle from this Court's decisons but
unreasonabty applies that principle to the facts of
the prisoner's case.203
One very important aspect of the O'Connor majority's
delineation of the "unreasonable application" standard is that it
disapproved a formulation that would have required a habeas
petitioner to show that all reasonable jurists would agree that the
state court acted unreasonably. Justice O'Connor observed that
such a standard, for which some support in prior decisions could be
found, "would tend to mislead federal judges because it focused
attention on a subjective, rather than an objective inquiry.
With regard to the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," the
majority stated that it refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta
of the Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state court
decision.2 °5
As to Williams' own habeas claim, a majority coalesced
around those segments of Justice Stevens' opinion that held the
state court's decision was both "contrary to" and "involved and
unreasonable application of' the Court's Strickland20 6 standard
203 Williams, 120 S.
204Id. at 1521-22.
205
206

Ct. at 1523.

Id. at 1523.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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governing the
Sixth Amendment's effectiveness of counsel
20 7
requirement.
Williams had been sentenced to death. On state postconviction review, the trial judge decided that defense counsel had
been ineffective by failing to investigate and present mitigating
evidence during the sentencing phase. The Virginia Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that even if counsel's performance
was subpar, the level of prejudice required to be shown under
Strickland had been raised by the Supreme Court's 1993 decision
in Lockhart v. Fretwell.20 8 The Fourth Circuit upheld that
determination. 20 9 The Stevens' majority rejected the idea that
Lockhart required, in addition to a Strickland-type prejudice
showing, a further inquiry into the fundamental fairness of
petitioner's trial. 2t ° Stevens pointed out that Lockhart involved an
unusual situation in which a defendant-favorable decision that
counsel failed to invoke had been overruled by the time the habeas
claim reached the Supreme Court.2 1'
Williams (Michael Wayne) v. Taylor 212 required the Court
to construe Section 2254(e)(2) of AEDPA, z13 which sharply limits
a habeas petitioner's ability to obtain a hearing on a claim the
207

Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1512-13.

506 U.S. 364 (1993).
209 Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1499-1503.
208

210Id. at 1512-15.
21 1

d. at 1512-13.
120 S. Ct. 1479.
213 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(e)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. III):
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a
claim in state court proceedings, the court shall not hold an
evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows
212

that-

(A) the claim relies on(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for
constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
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factual basis for which was not developed in state court. In a
unanimous decision, written by Justice Kennedy, the Court held
that this provision does not apply unless there has been some fault,
amounting at least to a lack of diligence, on the part of the
petitioner or his attorney.E14
Section 2254(e)(2) provides that if the applicant has failed
to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,
the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless
certain conditions obtain.21 5 The state argued that the section
applies regardless of whether the petitioner is at fault in some way
216
for the failure of the factual basis for the claim to be developed.
The Cour rejected this "no-fault" reading of the statute,
stating that in its customary and preferred sense, 'fail' connotes
some omission, fault, or negligence on the part of the person who
has failed to do something,-- a no-fault rule would more logically
use the formulation "did not" than "has failed to."'217 Of
considerable importance is the Court's ultimate conclusion that the
purposes of AEDPA do not demand adoption of the state's no-fault
reading and that firtherance of comity, equity, and federalism does
not require that petitioners who exercise diligence in pursuing their
claims be treated the same as petitioners who do not.
The Court
then determined that Williams could not be blamed for the
underdevelopment of the factual bases of two of his three 21claims,
9
those relating to juror bias and to prosecutorial misconduct.
The interesting aspect of these two cases is the possibility
that the Court may be approaching habeas corpus a little more
progressively than its dismal record in recent years would lead one
to expect. However, I think it too early to tell if these two cases
warrant a feeling of greater comfort on the part of state defendants.
Nonetheless, it is refreshing to note that even this Supreme Court
finds some of the Fourth Circuit's habeas corpus jurisprudence
unpalatable.

214 Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1488-90.
215 See supra note 213 and accompanying
2 6 Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1489.
217 Id. at 1488.
2
1Sd.at 1490-91.
219 Id. at 1491-94.

text.
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VIII. JURY REQUESTS
Well, here's a Fourth Circuit ruling that five Justices did
not find unpalatable, although it should have. In Weeks v.
Angelone,220 the Court held that the Constitution is not violated
when a trial judge simply redirects a capital jury's attention to a
specific paragraph of a constitutionally sufficient instruction in
response to a question regarding the proper consideration of
mitigating circumstances.221
In this capital case, the jury was given a pattern instruction
setting out the sentencing options and the two aggravating factors
alleged by the prosecution. The instruction said that at least one
aggravating factor had to be found beyond a reasonable doubt in
order for the death penalty to be imposed. After deliberating for a
time, the jury sent out a written question asking whether if it
believed that the defendant was guilty of at least one aggravating
factor, its duty was "to issue the death penalty" or to "decide (even
though he is guilty of one of the alternatives) whether or not to
issue the death penalty, or one of the life sentences? '222 Defense
counsel asked the court to tell the jurors that even if they found one
or both aggravators, they could still impose one of the life
sentences. The court refused, saying that it could not improve on
its previous instruction; it then referred
the jurors to the relevant
22 3
instruction.
original
its
paragraph in
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that
a jury is presumed to follow its instructions and is presumed to
understand a judge's answer to a question. 224 He emphasized that
Weeks' jury did not inform the court that after reading the relevant
paragraph of the instruction, it still did not understand its role. "To
presume otherwise," he said, "would require reversal every time a
jury inquires about a matter 225
of constitutional significance,
answer."
judge's
the
regardless of

221

120 S. Ct. 727 (2000).
Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 729.

222

Id. at 730-31.

220

223 Id.

224
225

Id. at 733.
id.
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In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsberg, and Breyer, stated that the jury instructions on
mitigating evidence were ambiguous and could be read to mean
that a life term could be imposed only if the prosecution proved
neither aggravator.226 He emphasized that the language to which
the trial court referred the jury had to have been the source of the
confusion the jury wished to have dispelled. By failing to respond
with a "simple, clear-cut statement" that the jury had no obligation
to impose death after finding at least one aggravator, the trial judge
created a reasonable likelihood that the jurors believed that
obligation to be real.227 To Rehnquist's emphasis on the fact that
after receiving the judge's response, the jury asked no further
questions, Stevens pointed out that their failure to do so probably
reflected a belief that to do so would be disrespectful.228
Perhaps I am dense. Have we reached such depths about
the death penalty that it is asking too much to be relatively sure
that the decision to impose it has been properly arrived at by a
jury? As a general matter, even in a non-capital run of the mill
criminal case, is it the better practice to send a confused jury back
to their deliberations with nothing more than a repeat of the
instruction that caused them to inquire in the first place? I think
the Court here is wrong on the merits. But I think its willingness
to subscribe to the broad proposition that a trial judge need do no
more than was done here is an unwise, unnecessary, and far more
costlier proposition than would be a requirement that in such
circumstance, sore further explication by the court of its
instructions be provided.

226 Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 735 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227

228

Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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IX. INTERSTATE DETAINERS
Brief mention is warranted of New York v. Hill,229 primarily
because the case is from New York and the New York Court of
Appeals' decision 23 was reversed unanimously by the Supreme
Court. In other words, the Court of Appeals apparently missed this
one by a wide margin.
The issue was whether defense counsel's agreement to a
trial date beyond the time period required by Article III of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) bars the defendant from
seeking dismissal because his trial did not occur within the
specified time period.2 3 1 The Court of Appeals held that it did not.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that the defendant was
precluded.
Under Article III (a) of the IAD, a prisoner who is the
subject of a detainer filed by another jurisdiction may request that
the charges underlying the detainer be disposed of within 180
days.232 The statute contains a proviso that "for good cause shown
in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance." 233 If a prisoner is not brought to trial
within the 180-day time period, Article V(c) requires dismissal of
234
the charging document with prejudice.
Hill was an Ohio prisoner who was the subject of a detainer
filed by New York and he invoked his speedy trial rights under the
IAD. However, when the Rochester prosecutor proposed a trial
date that was beyond the 180 days, his attorney agreed. Later, Hill
moved for a dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the 180day period had run. 235 The Court of Appeals held that something
229 528 U.S. 110, 120 S.Ct. 659 (2000).
230
231

People v. Hill, 92 N.Y.2d 406, 704 N.E.2d 542, 681 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1998).
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers 18 U.S.C. App. § 2 is codified in New

York in N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 580.20. It is a contract that 48 states and the
District of Columbia have entered into for the purpose of resolving one state's
outstanding charges against a prisoner in another state's custody. Hill, 120 S.
Ct. at 662.
232 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 580.20 (McKinney 2000).
233 Hill, 120 S.Ct. at 662-63.
134 Id.at 663.
235

Id.
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more affirmative than counsel's acquiescence was required before
could be deemed to have waived his IAD speedy trial
a prisoner
rights. 236
Justice Scalia observed that there are some fundamental
rights for which the defendant "must personally make an informed
waiver,, 237 and others that "may be effected by actions of
counsel., 238 This case did not involve a purported prospective
waiver of all protection of the IAD's time limits but merely
agreement to a specified delay in trial. 239 He stated that "[w]hen
that subject is under consideration, only counsel is in a position to
assess the benefit or detriment of the delay to the defendant's
case.... Requiring express assent from the defendant himself for
such routine and often repetitive scheduling determinations would
consume time to no apparent purpose., 240 He also pointed out that
"by allowing the court to grant 'good cause continuances' when
contemplates
either 'prisoner or his counsel' is present, the IAD
24 1
that scheduling questions may be left to counsel.",
It appears that I have run out of time. It is not my fault; it
is the fault of the Supreme Court. This Term, the Court simply
gave us so much to discuss. It was a dynamic year for the Court
and it wasn't a bad year for the defense. In closing, I can state
only that this coming Term may be another big one insofar as
constitutional criminal procedure is concerned. Already, the Court
has agreed to hear four major Fourth Amendment cases,242
including urine testing for drugs of pregnant women in Charleston,
South Carolina's hospitals, 243 not allowing a person enter his home
236

People v. Hill, 92 N.Y. 2d 406, 704 N.E.2d 542, 681 N.Y.S.2d 775.

237 Hill, 120 S.Ct. at 664.
238

Id.

239 id.

id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
h
242 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (41 Cir. 1999), cert.
240
241

granted, 120 S. Ct. 1239 (Feb. 28, 2000)(no. 99-936); Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 195 F.3d 242 ( 5 dh Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2715 (June 26,
2000)(no. 99-1408); Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659 (7' Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 120 S. Ct. 1156 (Feb. 22, 2000) (no.
99-1030); Illinois v. McArthur, 304 Ill. App. 3d 395, 713 N.E.2d 93 (1999),
cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1830 (May 1, 2000) (no. 99-1132).
243 Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 473.
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while the police are awaiting the issuance of a search warrant. 244 1
look forward to returning next year and discussing these and many
more cases that the Court will have decided. Hopefully, I will
have ample time to do justice to them.

244

McArthur, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 396-97.
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